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Abstract
The present paper gives a description and philosophical analysis of the conceptual vari-
ation in the homology concept. It is argued that different homology are concepts used
in evolutionary and comparative biology, in developmental biology, and in molecular
biology. The argument is based on a conceptual role semantics— the identity of con-
cepts supervenes on conceptual roles. The differences between homology concepts are
due to the fact that these concepts play different theoretical roles for different biological
fields or research approaches. The specific theoretical needs and explanatory interests
of different parts of biology lead to different homology concepts.
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1. Introduction. Homology is a crucial biological concept; in fact, some consider
it one of the most important concepts in all of biology (Donoghue 1992; Wake 1994;
Raff 1996; Abouheif et al. 1997). Despite its importance for biology homology has
not been extensively discussed by philosophers of science. The homology concept has
a long and rich history, dating back more than 200 years. While this term was orig-
inally used mainly in comparative and later in evolutionary biology, it has recently
become important for developmental and molecular biology. In the last decades several
aspects and several levels of homology emerged and became relevant for some fields
(e.g., serial homology, molecular homology). Nowadays the term ‘homology’ exhibits
noticeable variation within the biological community. Different biological fields have a
different perspective on homology. In fact, several so-called ‘concepts’ or ‘definitions’ of
homology are proposed, criticized and defended. The term ‘homology’, as it seems, is
tokened with a different content in different parts of the biological community. The aim
of the present paper is to analyze this conceptual variation and to offer a philosophical
account of it.
As will be argued, there are three different homology concepts used in biology.
These different concepts correspond to three fields within biology—comparative and
evolutionary biology, developmental biology, and molecular biology. Using conceptual
role semantics as a heuristic tool for the study of differences among scientific concepts,
my claim is that these conceptual differences are due to the fact that homology plays
a different theoretical role for different fields and research approaches. That is, homol-
ogy concepts are used for different concrete epistemic goals. A particular homology
concept is used to bring about specific kinds of scientific knowledge, it is employed to
yield characteristic theoretical inferences and explanations. The following discussion
will make clear that the homology concepts that are characteristic for the discussed
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communities are embedded in these different approaches and are used to account for
things that are of specific importance for each field.
2. A conceptual role approach to conceptual differences in science. Following
cognitive scientists and several philosophers of mind, I take concepts to be mental
entities. Several philosophical authors deal with the concepts a particular individual
possesses and thus assume that concepts are mental particulars (Fodor 1998). My
approach focuses on the group-level instead. As I will discuss a case where a concept
is used in a certain biological field in a specific way, I am interested in concepts as
entities that are shared by different individuals. For this reason, I consider concepts as
population-level abstractions of mental representations. The example I discuss is a case
of conceptual differences of a term that emerged in the course of scientific history. This
conceptual variation is due to changing and newly emerging theoretical perspectives.
Concepts are historical entities that form lineages. The different current homology
concepts are derived from one original homology concept—the one still used in com-
parative and evolutionary biology. The original concept migrated into new disciplines
and underwent adaptive radiation— leading to different specialized homology concepts.
Homology is what I call an investigative kind concept. An investigative kind is a group
of things that are presumed to belong together due to some underlying mechanism or a
structural property. The idea that these entities belong to a kind might be due to some
interesting similarities: scientists perceive a certain pattern in nature. However, these
similarities are not deemed to be what characterizes this kind. Instead, an investigative
kind is specified by some theoretically important, but yet unknown underlying feature
or process that is presumed to account for the observed similarities. Thus an inves-
tigative kind concept is associated with a search for the basis of this kind. An example
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is the species concept. We are able to recognize species, but it is not perfectly clear
what accounts for the origin and coherence of these units— leading to different species
definitions. A full theoretical account of the investigative kind can only be given after
appropriate empirical study and might reveal a variety of complications. An inves-
tigative kind concept may even change its reference throughout scientific investigation.
In any case, an investigative kind concept goes together with a scientific search which
might be open-ended.
The homology concept is an investigative kind concept for the following reasons.
Biologists perceived and perceive a unity of form among different taxa. Structures in
organisms from different species seem to correspond to each other. Phyla, for instance,
are taxa which encompass those animals that have a common body plan. This allows
setting morphological structures of different species in correspondence (e.g., according
to their relative position in the body plan). Homology refers to this correspondence:
corresponding structures in different organisms are called ‘homologues’ or said to be
‘homologous to each other’. Homologues often have the same name, even across dis-
tantly related species. Biologist are able to recognize homologous structures, and there
are accepted criteria of homology. However, the perceived structural similarity is not
to be confused with the nature of the correspondence called homology. The following
definition by Richard Owen refers to this superficial similarity, which is irrelevant for
homology, by “variety of form”. (Owen’s definition is still favored by some contempo-
rary biologists.)
HOMOLOGUE . . . The same organ in different animals under every variety of
form and function. (Owen 1843, p. 374)
Considering homology an investigative kind concept means that there is a search for the
biological basis of homology. An account is needed of what characterizes the structures
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that are (considered) homologous, i.e., an explanation of the perceived phenomenon
picked out by examples and criteria is to be given. This leads—based on different
theoretical perspectives— to different historical and contemporary accounts of homol-
ogy. For instance idealistic morphology explained the unity of form with reference to
metaphysical notions such as Owen’s archetype. Structures were claimed to be homol-
ogous in case they were (empirical and imperfect) instantiations of the same abstract
and geometrically perfect archetype (Owen 1848). Later, a common evolutionary ori-
gin became the standard explanation of homologous correspondence of structures. In
fact, reference to common ancestry was even included in definitions of homology (see
Lankester 1870). For some contemporary developmental approaches to homology, refer-
ence to inheritance from a common ancestor cannot be a complete explanation, because
it does not give a mechanistic explanation of how the same structures reappear again
and again in different ontogenies.
This investigative kind concept account of homology points to the historical root of
the homology concept. In addition, it explains why there can be different accounts of
homology, even though different fields of biology use the same criteria of homology and
consider largely the same structures as homologous. Often biologists just speak about
the homology concept. This is due to the common historical root, accepted criteria and
instances of homology, and the general idea that homology refers to the correspond-
ing structures in different organisms. Nevertheless, this paper is about the conceptual
variation in the term ‘homology’. Based on a conceptual role semantics approach, I
will argue that there are different homology concepts used in biology. Conceptual role
semantics is not a particular theory, rather it is a broad framework that encompasses
various (sometimes very different) semantic approaches in philosophy (compare Field
1977; Harman 1987; Peacocke 1992; Brandom 1994; Wedgwood 2001) and cognitive
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science (Miller and Johnson-Laird 1976; Woods 1981). The idea of conceptual role se-
mantics (also called functional role or inferential role semantics) is that the content of
syntactic entities and mental representations is (at least partially) constituted by the
cognitive or inferential role they have for a thinker or a language community. Partic-
ular concepts, for instance, have a specific role in theoretical thought, perception, and
decision making.
Conceptual role semantics has been advanced as an account of mental and semantic
content. However, I am not concerned with general issues from the philosophy of mind
and language, but only with concepts and conceptual change in science. I use conceptual
role semantics as a heuristic tool to detect and account for conceptual differences. What
I assume is that the content of terms supervenes on conceptual roles. This does not
imply that I identify conceptual content with conceptual roles, or that I assume a one-
one relationship between concepts and conceptual roles (which would lead to holism
about concept individuation). Instead, the assumption is that concepts can be different
only insofar they have different conceptual roles. The heuristic impact of this approach
is that one has to search for possible conceptual differences by looking at the conceptual
or theoretical roles of concepts.
Conceptual (in particular inferential) roles are often associated with narrow (as
opposed to wide) content, for they are usually viewed as supervening on the mind, but
excluding the relationship between the mind and the world. But a theory of content
needs to account for the representational aspects of content—and thus for the possibil-
ity of misrepresentation and falsehood. It has been argued that versions of conceptual
role semantics focusing on inferential role or narrow content alone cannot give a sat-
isfactory account of content (see, e.g., Perlmann 1997). Proponents of conceptual role
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semantics have reacted to this problem by including the mind-world relationship in the
conceptual role (Harman 1987), or by saying that inferential role/narrow content is only
one aspect of content to by supplied by an account of reference (Field 1977; Loar 1981;
Schiffer 1981; McGinn 1982; Block 1986; Lycan 1988). As I do not put forward a theory
of content I am not concerned with these problems. My above assumption about the
identity of concepts abstracts from possible differences in wide content, because this is
not of concern for my discussion. My goal is to detect and study differences in certain
scientific concepts; so for my purposes the assumption that the content of concepts
supervenes on conceptual roles needs no further qualification or modification.
What do I am mean by conceptual roles? As the present discussion deals with sci-
entific concepts, I focus on the role concepts play in theoretical reasoning. Theoretical
reasoning does not presuppose that there is an explicitly formulated theory. The molec-
ular homology concept has a theoretical role independent of whether there is something
like a ‘theory of molecular biology’. One important aspect of the theoretical role of con-
cepts is their inferential role. A particular concept licenses certain inferences. By virtue
of its content, a concept has inferential connections to other concepts. If two concepts
support two classes of inferences that are different, then they have a distinct inferential
role.1 The inferences that scientific concepts make possible are important for producing
scientific knowledge and justifying scientific claims. While philosophical accounts along
the line of conceptual role semantics have stressed the inferential potential of concepts,
one needs to keep in mind that concepts— in particular scientific concepts—are also
used for explanations. And it is not obvious how explanation relates to standard models
of inference making. Salmon (1984) argues that explanation are not arguments (nei-
ther inductive nor deductive), so the inferential role of concepts need not encompass
their explanatory role. Concepts are employed or intended to account for particular
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phenomena. Propositions containing a concept can explain certain facts. A particular
concept might be crucial for explaining a specific class of processes or situations, while
in order to account for another class of phenomena a different concept needs to be
employed. My case study will argue that a crucial difference between the homology
concept used in developmental biology and the homology concept of evolutionary and
comparative biology is their difference in explanatory potential. In fact, developmental
biology uses its particular homology concept because other homology concepts cannot
yield the type of explanations that are important for developmental biology.
As I use a conceptual role approach, my focus is on the inferences and explanations
licensed by concepts. This has the following advantage. My approach links concepts
to the epistemic products and theoretical goals of a scientific field or research approach.
Obtaining certain kinds of knowledge—the results of specific types of inferences and ex-
planations—may be characteristic for a specific scientific theory or research approach.
The idea that the meaning of concepts supervenes on conceptual role implies that con-
ceptual differences between different research fields are to be pinned down by taking a
look at their specific epistemic products. My conceptual role semantics approach thus
fulfills a heuristic function by suggesting how to detect possible conceptual differences.
In addition, it sets the stage for explaining these conceptual differences. The idea that
a concept plays a particular role for a research approach focuses on the fact that there
is a scientific need for having this particular (rather than another) concept. Particular
scientific fields have specific theoretical goals. Concepts are employed to pursue these
goals; in fact, concepts are shaped and designed to bring about the intended epistemic
product.2 Thus the existence of conceptual differences can be explained by reference
to differences in theoretical goals.
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Now that I have motivated my central assumption—that the identity of concepts
supervenes on conceptual roles— I need to lay out the individuation criteria that I will
use for the following case study. It is notoriously difficult to put forward principled
individuation criteria for concepts (Thagard 1992). Authors such as Devitt (1996) en-
dorse the notion of analyticity by arguing that there are inferences that are constitutive
of the content of concepts. I do not commit myself to a clear-cut analytic-synthetic
distinction. There might be no immutable distinction between matters of meaning and
matters of fact. Changes in belief may bring about changes in the content of concepts.
In fact, the history of science shows that changing a concept or a conceptual system
may be rational in the face of new empirical evidence. For instance, the concepts of
mass and energy changed in the transition from classical to relativistic mechanics; and
the gene concept improved from the Mendelian to the molecular gene concept. This
makes it hard to make a case for inferences that are licensed by the content of concepts
alone as opposed to inferences that are justified by empirical background beliefs.
I will follow Harman (1973) and Block (1986) in assuming that not identity, but
similarity in conceptual role is sufficient to share the same concept. The inferential
roles of a term may differ slightly between persons—people have differing beliefs and
endorse different inferences. People may differ in their mental representations. I view a
concept as a cluster of similar mental representations. Taking a concept as a group-level
entity abstracts from this inter-personal variation and focuses on the more substantial
difference between different concepts. I take two terms to have a different content
in case they make inferences or explanations possible that are relevantly dissimilar.
What counts as relevant is dependent on the scientific standards of the given situation.
The concrete scientific situation determines what counts as giving a justification or an
explanation that is different in kind from other justifications or explanations. In what
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follows, I will present a case study in which I argue that the term ‘homology’ corresponds
to different concepts. These different homology concepts support different kinds of
inferences and explanation, and biologists consider these differences as important— it
matters for biology whether a specific type of explanation can be supported or not by
a particular homology concept.
The point of my claim that there are different homology concepts used is not that
biologists are confused when they just use the term ‘homology’. Instead, biologists
may be aware of the fact that other fields use homology differently and have a different
understanding of homology. The purpose of my paper is to give a philosophical analysis
of the variation in the term ‘homology’ (which is so large that we can distinguish
different homology concepts). I intend to show that this variation consist in differential
inferential and explanatory roles, so that different homology concepts yield different
epistemic products. And I make clear how this difference in epistemic products relates to
the theoretical goals of the respective biological disciplines. The upshot of my argument
is that a conceptual role approach gives a good account of the variation of the concept
under consideration.
3. Homology in comparative and evolutionary biology. The homology concept
originated in the context of comparative biology, in particular comparative morphology.
Among current homology concepts the following understanding of homology in compar-
ative and evolutionary biology is the most traditional one. In what follows, I will refer to
this homology concept by the term phylogenetic homology. In comparative morphology
the above mentioned idea of homology as something that refers to the corresponding
structures is in this field most clearly employed. In particular bones, organs, muscles,
and tissues are the types of characters that are homologized. The criteria of homology
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used are the relative position with respect to other structures (topological similarity),
the connectivity to adjacent structures (e.g., blood vessels and nerves), similarity in
structural detail and histology, and correspondence of the developmental origin. Even
though the character distribution on a phylogenetic tree is an additional important
criterion for assessing hypotheses of homology, many of the criteria used for practical
work resemble pre-Darwinian comparative anatomy to some extent.3 There is a great
deal of historical continuity between the historical homology concept and homology as
it is used in current comparative morphology.
The aim of comparative biology is to compare the characters of different species,
yielding systematic descriptions of large groups of organisms. Homology is a relational
notion used in comparing organisms or species. It identifies characters in different
species that correspond to each other. A homologue behaves and changes as a unit
in ontogeny and phylogeny. The fact that a considered part of an organism can be
homologized with a part in another species is evidence for this part actually being a
unit of the organism, while not sufficiently individualized parts of the body may lead to
dubious or conflicting hypotheses of homology (Wagner 1989b; Wagner and Gauthier
1999). In this manner, homology helps to break organisms down into natural units and
it links these units across species. Homology individuates biological characters. (This is
clearly expressed by the above quoted definition of Owen.) For this reason, identifying
homologues is an important step in comparison and classification. The corresponding
characters in different species are identified as the corresponding (or the ‘same’ ones)
and often given an identical name. In the case of some structures, or of more distantly
related organisms, it is by no means obvious how to homologize structures. Despite
large differences between species, homology refers to common patterns across large
groups of organisms.
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By establishing correspondence of structures between different species homology
allows for generalized descriptive knowledge across species. Properties that hold for
some structures in a species are likely to hold for the homologous structure in another
species. This is due to the fact that homologues are derived from a common ancestral
structure. Morphological, histological, or developmental descriptions are likely to apply
to a larger class of organisms and their corresponding parts. This is why neuroanatom-
ical descriptions and theories may for instance just talk about ‘the’ cerebrum, referring
to a class of homologues. As phylogenetic homology makes reference to the common
ancestry of homologous structures, the homology concept allows for inferences from the
properties of one type of organism to other organisms. Thus, identifying homologues
and basing comparative descriptions on classes of homologues yields systematic and
unified morphological knowledge. Even before the explicit use of the homology concept,
biologists gave the same name to corresponding structures of different species. In this
manner, they followed a practice that allowed for effective descriptions. Once, later on,
‘homology’ was clearly available as a concept, this comparative practice could be made
explicit, discussed, and defended. Having homology as a concept allows for reflection
about the nature of homology and the criteria of homology employed. Biologists make
in particular explicit use of the homology concept when they need to defend their hy-
pothesis of homology, thereby justifying their naming of structures and comparative
descriptions made in particular cases. For these reasons, the phylogenetic homology
concept is vital for the types of inferences and their justification made in comparative
biology.
In addition, besides just providing comparative descriptions of organisms, the com-
parison of characters is an important step in giving taxonomic classifications of organ-
isms. Structures identified as homologues can be compared in detail; and the similarities
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and differences obtaining between homologous structures of different species provide the
data for classification. Stable classifications can only be obtained by comparing homol-
ogous structures. Reference to homology justifies the fact that certain structures of
different species are compared. In this manner, phylogenetic homology serves the end
of comparative biology, producing and justifying systematic and general descriptions
across species and providing comparisons that are effective for classifications.
In evolutionary biology the focus is on the change of characters in the course of
phylogeny. Homology is a concept that links entities over time. In accounts of mor-
phological evolution homologues become historical units that date back to an ancestral
character. Evolutionary approaches to homology are usually so-called transformational
accounts of homology (Hennig 1966; Mayr 1982; Bock 1989; Donoghue 1992), because
an ancestral and descendant character are defined as being homologous in case they
are connected by a transformation series of intermediate homologues (in a lineage of
species leading from the ancestor to the descendant). Evolutionary biology is interested
in giving an account of the adaptive modification of traits. The concept of homology is
necessary to conceptualize a lineage of characters. As the process of adaptation oper-
ates over many generations, the corresponding features that are subject to change have
to be identified. The homologues in a lineage are the entities underlying change. For
instance in order to talk about the same (type of) selection pressure operating in some
morphological structure over time one needs to identify the lineage of characters on
which this selection pressure operates. Once a lineage of characters has been identified
the transformation of these traits can now be addressed and divergence in splitting
lineages can be studied and explained. Due to different adaptive histories homologues
may be quite dissimilar in shape and function. Despite the existence of modification
in the course of evolution, homology refers to a common basis of different character
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tokens. Identifying homologous structures in ancestor and descendant is a precondition
for giving an adaptation explanation of the change of these structures. Thus, phylo-
genetic homology is used to yield (together with other concepts) an epistemic product
of evolutionary biology—describing and explaining the adaptive modification of char-
acters. While homology in comparative biology allows for inferences, in evolutionary
biology it is in addition a conceptual precondition for explanations. In short, the the-
oretical role of the phylogenetic homology concept—used in comparative morphology
and evolutionary biology— is to link characters across species in order to conceptualize
the natural units that underlie variation across species or evolutionary change, yielding
systematic comparative knowledge and making adaptation explanations possible.4
4. Homology in developmental biology. Developmental homology—as I will
call the homology concept used in developmental biology— is historically derived from
phylogenetic homology.5 Due to the migration of the original homology concept into
a new discipline, the concept underwent change. Despite the similarities between phy-
logenetic and developmental homology, there are relevant differences. Biologists both
from comparative/evolutionary and developmental biology largely use the same crite-
ria of homology (Roth 1994), and consider the same structures of different species as
homologous. Nevertheless, the homology concept of developmental biology has a wider
extension. Two points are worth mentioning. First, developmental biologists apply
homology to a larger domain of biological characters than comparative or evolutionary
biologists usually do. In developmental biology, the theoretical focus is on how differ-
entiation takes place and structures are formed in the course of ontogeny by means of
developmental resources such as genes, cytoplasmic factors, and extracellular signals.
Developmental biology studies different cell types, tissue types, transient structures,
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and developmental precursors. It is the branch of biology that addresses most com-
pletely all levels of organismic organization. In particular, it has to study how these
different levels interact. For this reason, when the issue of homology arises conceptually
in the comparison of the development in different organisms, it becomes apparent that
homology exists on different levels of the biological hierarchy. Genes and proteins in
different species can be homologous (when they are derived from a common ancestral
gene or protein). Calling types of cells and tissues the same often amounts to an im-
plicit statement of homology. Due to the explanatory focus of developmental biology
homology has to be studied on different levels of biological organization, and thus the
concept of homology became explicitly applied to different levels.6
Second, there is the issue of serial homology. This is the most apparent evidence
of the fact that there are differences among homology concepts in different biological
fields. Sometimes an organism has a structure or a certain pattern that occurs repeat-
edly, for instance, hair in mammals, leafs in plants, the vertebrae in vertebrates, or the
segments in metameric animals. This multiple occurrence of basically the same struc-
ture is referred to by the term serial homology (or also iterative or repetitive homology).
This type of homology was recognized by former idealistic morphology because of their
geometrical-topological approach to homology. (For instance, Owen considered the dif-
ferent vertebrae of an organism as derived from a common archetypal ‘ideal vertebrae’.)
Within an evolutionary framework, this aspect of homology was largely ignored by ac-
counts in comparative biology. Obviously the different vertebrae are not derived from
an ancestor with only one vertebrae. In contemporary comparative and evolutionary
biology, serial homology is usually ignored. Sometimes its possibility is denied and the
idea of serial homology is attacked (Mayr 1982; Ax 1989; Bock 1989). This is due to the
theoretical and explanatory focus of these branches of biology. Comparative biology
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compares different species (and evolutionary biology deals with lineages of different
species). Important goals of these disciplines are identifying homologues of distinct
species, detailed comparisons of different species and their characters. Serial homology,
however, sets two parts of the very same organism in correspondence; this is why it
is not important for comparative and evolutionary biology. Thus, serial homologues
are (usually) not part of the extension of this homology concept. In developmental
biology, on the other hand, serial homology is widely accepted and utilized (de Beer
1971; van Valen 1982; Wagner 1989a; Minelli and Peruffo 1991; Haszprunar 1992; Roth
1994; Gilbert, Opitz, and Raff 1996). This is due to the fact that developmental bi-
ology describes and compares processes going on within individuals, trying to account
for the formation of structures in the course of ontogeny. When similar structures are
present several times within an organism, it is natural to ask whether this is due to
similar development using similar developmental factors and processes. For instance,
limb development is one of the best studied morphogenetic phenomena in tetrapods.
Due to their common topology the front limb and the hind limb are considered as
serial homologues (even though they may look for adaptive reasons quite dissimilar).
Hypotheses take into consideration that repeated patterns might be due to the dupli-
cation of genes or developmental programs, or the use of a the same developmental
resource on different parts of the organism.
In the same manner that comparative and evolutionary biologists sometimes attack
the understanding of homology in developmental biology, developmental biologists are
aware of this conceptual difference, too (Wagner 1989a; Minelli and Peruffo 1991; Roth
1991; Shubin 1994; Sluys 1996). The discussion already pointed to the fact that this
difference has something to do with the different theoretical interests and goals of these
fields. Indeed, the conceptual difference goes beyond a difference in extension; the
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difference in reference is due to a difference in sense or content. My following account
of the conceptual variation is that it is due to the fact that homology concepts play
different theoretical roles in these two parts of biology. That is, homology concepts are
used to generate different types of biological knowledge or to explain different types of
phenomena. Each homology concept serves the theoretical interests of the field in which
it is used by being a necessary conceptual ingredient in bringing about the epistemic
product characteristic of that field.
In the case of developmental biology, the epistemic product is the explanation of the
formation of structures. Accounting for the origin of form essentially involves studying
the development of organisms and their parts. Knowledge about developmental mech-
anisms and explanations of the origin of structures are systematized by concepts that
refer to a commonality of developmental mechanisms. In developmental explanations
the focus is on considerations about a corresponding causal origin, a common main-
tenance, or a comparable developmental role, behavior, or nature of structures (e.g.,
whether a part is a module of an organism). Developmental homology refers to similar,
repeated, or corresponding structures of organisms. This homology concept is used to
explain this similarity of structures within and between organisms by pointing to a (yet
hardly understood) common underlying developmental basis. A developmental homol-
ogy concept is intended to explain why the same structures (homologues including serial
homologues) reliably reappear in different parts of the organism and in subsequent gen-
erations (Wagner 1996), by referring to those causal factors and developmental features
that account for this. Such a homology concept is about the mechanistic underpinnings
of structural identity of homologous characters in the course of ontogeny and phylogeny.
In this manner, the developmental homology concept serves one fundamental aim of
developmental biology—explaining how structures emerge in ontogeny and why they
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are how they are (which has a bearing on explaining why structures are conserved or
transformed in the course of phylogeny).
A consequence of the difference in content or theoretical role of the developmental
and phylogenetic homology concept is a difference in reference—developmental ho-
mology applies to a larger domain of characters and to homologues within the same
organism (serial homology). Even if one abstracts from this and considers nothing but
homology among morphological structures in different species (i.e., the extension of
the phylogenetic homology concept), the different biological branches discussed offer a
different account of why these structures are homologous. Approaches in comparative
and evolutionary biology just refer to inheritance from a common ancestral structure as
the defining feature of homology. For a developmental biologist, reference to common
ancestry (or to the inheritance of genetic information) is non-explanatory, because it
does not give us a causal account of how and why the same morphological structure
are formed in different organism (Wagner 1989b; Roth 1994). Instead, reference to the
developmental processes generating this structures in different organisms is a necessary
part of any developmental approach. As development is not yet sufficiently under-
stood, there are different tentative developmental definitions of homology proposed
(van Valen 1982; Roth 1984; Wagner 1989a; Striedter 1998). Despite these different
proposals, developmental biologists agree on the fact that a developmental homology
concept has to account for the above mentioned features—explaining the reappearance
of similar structures within one or several individuals. For this reason, in developmen-
tal approaches there is an emphasis on common developmental features rather than on
common ancestry. For example, the homology definition proposed by Roth (1984) talks
about shared developmental pathways. Gu¨nter Wagner’s definition of homology, his so-
called ‘biological homology concept’, focuses on shared developmental constraints, but
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does not make explicit reference to common ancestry (1989a).
The phylogenetic homology concept has a very limited explanatory potential, its
main role is to yield inferences. Phylogenetic homology— just making reference to com-
mon ancestry—can only account for the taxonomic distribution of characters (Wagner
1994).7 But it cannot fulfill the explanatory tasks of developmental biology; it can-
not explain why the same structure emerges in different places of an organisms or in
different generations. A developmental homology concept—making reference to devel-
opmental processes— is needed to yield these types of explanations. This difference in
conceptual role between phylogenetic and developmental homology justifies the claim
that they are actually two different concepts. Developmental homology supports types
of explanations that phylogenetic homology does not support and these explanations are
distinct (in fact, developmental) and important explanations. Phylogenetic and de-
velopmental homology serve different epistemic and explanatory goals. Biologists are
aware of the fact that comparative biology is interested in the phylogenetic relation-
ship of species and in grouping organisms into taxa, but that developmental approaches
have different aims (Roth 1991; Wagner 1994; Sluys 1996). Rather than identifying and
comparing homologues, the aim of developmental biology is to explain how structures
emerge in ontogeny and why the same structure develops in the next generation. Since
both disciplines use their homology concept for their theoretical goals, the different
understanding of homology is a matter of meaning rather than of belief. The dispute
of how homology is to be understood or to be defined cannot be settled by standard
empirical findings. For instance, comparative biologists criticize the understanding of
homology in developmental biology, because for them homology is about comparing dif-
ferent species and nothing else (Ax 1989), but not about comparing structures within
organisms (serial homologues) or explaining the origin of characters.8 In contrast to
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homology in comparative and evolutionary biology, the conceptual role of homology in
developmental biology is to account for the formation of similar structures within and
between organisms and for structural identity in ontogeny and phylogeny.
5. Homology in molecular biology. In molecular biology it is mainly genes and
proteins that are homologized. The concept of molecular homology often refers to
the similarity of DNA or amino acid sequences (Hillis 1994; Reeck et al. 1987). In
fact, sometimes it is said that two sequences are 65% homologous, which means that
this percentage of nucleotides is identical in the aligned sequences. Thus molecular
homology is not a qualitative notion, but comes in degrees. Even more important
is the fact that molecular homology is a statement about the similarity of genes and
proteins, not about their evolutionary origin— inheritance from a common ancestor.
For a more evolutionary understanding that views homology as a concept referring
to the common evolutionary origin of structures, mere sequence similarity is just a
criterion for common ancestry (i.e., homology), but not to be equated with the concept
of homology (see below). Nevertheless, the usage of molecular homology as sequence
similarity is quite common in molecular biology. This is due to the research scope of
many parts of molecular biology. In this field the focus is on how molecular entities
operate and interact; the theoretical goal is to describe molecular processes and explain
phenomena at the molecular level. For this purpose, a comparison of genes and proteins
(and their parts) is important, because similar genes have similar genes products and
similar proteins are likely to behave similarly in biochemical reactions or to be part of
a similar pathway.
A good deal of easily accessible information about the structure and function of
genes and proteins is given by the mere DNA or amino acid sequence. Discovery in
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molecular biology depends to a large extent on the search for correspondence among
sequences. For instance, it is of particular importance to know whether two proteins
have similar functional domains. Genes and proteins are grouped into families and
classes in the case of high similarity of relevant parts or domains. Knowing that a
protein has a certain domain that is known from other proteins yields information about
how it probably behaves in molecular and cellular processes. For instance, proteins
with a GPI anchor are known to be membrane bound, so when a newly studied protein
reveals to have such a domain it is very likely that it is membrane bound, too. To take
another well-known example, all proteins with a homeodomain bind to DNA. Molecular
biology often does not deal with the classification and comparison of organisms or with
phylogenetic or evolutionary aspects. Instead the focus is on molecular substances
and the pathways in which they figure. A new gene or protein is compared to known
ones. Similarity allows for an inference or a hypothesis about the function, effect,
or role of a new molecular entity. This provides the possibility to examine a new
protein more effectively using knowledge about established proteins and their pathways.
The knowledge about certain molecular systems can be used to transfer experimental
approaches and research strategies to other yet unstudied systems, provided that both
are known to be similar. Often the inference from one system to a new one yields
effective ways of discovery rather than a direct confirmation of the properties of the
new system.
The emphasis in molecular biology is on the practical, experimental level. The aim
is to discover mechanisms, which is crucial for explanations on the molecular level the
possibility of technological manipulation. For this reason, an operational account of
homology is important. Molecular homology as mere similarity of DNA or amino acid
sequence is an understanding of homology that is tied to the experimental practice of
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molecular biology. It is effective to organize knowledge about molecular mechanisms
and direct experimental practice. The conceptual role of molecular homology is to
infer theoretical hypothesis and experimental strategies about molecular entities and
mechanisms. Molecular homology is an operational concept that is theoretically not as
robust as phylogenetic or developmental homology. The fact that two gene sequences
are similar is not to be equated with the fact that they are derived from a common
ancestral gene. A collection of similar genes is not a lineage of characters to which
phylogenetic homology refers. Structural similarity refers to a pattern, but does not
include the ontogenetic or phylogenetic processes that brought about the similarity. For
this reason, the molecular homology concept is not able to support the phylogenetic
inferences and developmental explanations that the homology concepts of evolutionary
and developmental biology support.9
6. Conclusion. I argued that the term ‘homology’ actually corresponds to different
concepts. My account of homology as an investigative kind concept pointed to the
common root of these homology concepts. These different concepts are referred to by
the same term because they are historically descended from one concept and they are
similar in certain respects. Across biological fields homology is assumed to designate
corresponding characters in different organisms, and the same criteria of homology are
used. The idea of an investigative kind concept also allows for an explanation of why
there are different accounts of largely the same objects that are grouped together as
homologues.
The focus of the present discussion was on the conceptual variation in the term
‘homology’. My conceptual role approach suggests searching for conceptual differences
by studying the different theoretical roles of concepts. The variation in the case of ho-
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mology is actually grouped around distinct poles that correspond to different biological
fields. I explained this variation with reference to the different epistemic interests and
theoretical goals of particular biological fields. Homology concepts are used to obtain
characteristic types of inferences and explanations. In the case of homology in compar-
ative and evolutionary biology, the goals are the comparison (and taxonomy) of species
and characters and the explanation of descent with modification. The theoretical role
of homology in comparative morphology and evolutionary biology is the individuation
of characters across species and the conceptualization of a lineage of species charac-
ters despite variation and potentially unlimited evolutionary change. This allows for
systematic and unified knowledge about the structure of organisms in the case of com-
parative morphology, and is a precondition for explaining adaptation in the case of
evolutionary biology. In developmental biology the goal is to figure out how and why
certain structures emerge in ontogeny. The conceptual role of developmental homology
is to explain the formation of similar structures within and between organisms and to
account for structural identity in ontogeny and phylogeny. Finally, in molecular biology
the epistemic aim is the study of biological processes at the molecular level and their
explanation by means of mechanisms. The role of molecular homology is the inference
of information about the molecular behavior of genes and proteins (and their parts),
particularly in order to guide further experimental investigation and technological ma-
nipulation.
Conceptual differences of a term have been subject to philosophical investigation.
While many former accounts of conceptual change focused on the reference of con-
cepts, studying differences in extension alone may in some cases be of limited value.
Conceptual roles cut finer than extension—concepts with the same content may have
the same extension. We saw that the conceptual variation in the homology concept
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goes beyond mere difference of reference. The phylogenetic and developmental homol-
ogy concepts differ in their explanatory potential. Conceptual roles not only offer a
more fine-grained analysis than the study of extension, they also explain why there
is a difference in content and possibly in extension. Biologist sometimes criticize the
homology concept of another field because the rival concept does not do the (in their
view) right theoretical job. A philosophical account should not just determine possible
differences of extension among homology concepts, but it should have a grasp on the
reasons of adopting or criticizing particular homology concepts—which seem to involve
more than the extension of these concepts. My discussion tried to explain the how the
variation in the homology concept came about by the different theoretical demands of
biological fields.
I used a conceptual role semantics approach as a heuristic device for the study of
homology. My approach suggested pinning down potential differences in the content
of the term ‘homology’ by looking at the theoretical role of this concept—the types of
inferences and explanations that a particular homology concept makes possible. This
account has the advantage that it links the individuation of concepts with the epistemic
product and theoretical goals of particular scientific fields or research approaches, which
in turn makes intelligible why a particular concept is used in a specific field. My
discussion of the homology concept suggests that a conceptual role semantics approach
might be a fruitful approach for the study of conceptual change and variation of several
scientific concepts.
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Notes
1More precisely, inference is a relationship between sentences or propositions— the
primary objects of semantic evaluation. The inferential role of a concept is the class
of inferences between propositions that this concept makes possible by virtue of being
part of some of these propositions. See Brandom (1994) for a detailed account along
these lines. Some authors that endorse conceptual role semantics have done this based
on their commitment to functionalism. The notion of interferential role I employ is
general enough so that I need not endorse a particular theory of the mind.
2This does not mean that a concept is always successful in accounting for what is
supposed to. Failure to do so is a reason for conceptual change.
3Compare the ‘principe des connexions’ of Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire (1818) with the
criteria of Adolf Remane (1952).
4Phylogenetic systematics or cladistics is the nowadays predominant theory of tax-
onomy and emerged in the last few decades. In this field of comparative biology a new
understanding of homology emerged (taxic as opposed to transformational homology),
which is tied to the methodological approach of cladistics. This paper is not the place
to discuss this other variant of the homology concept. In a nutshell, the conceptual role
of taxic homology is the characterization of natural groups of species (taxa). See Hen-
nig (1966) and Sober (1988) for a discussion of the cladistic methodology, and Nelson
(1994) and Sluys (1996) for a defense of taxic homology.
5The understanding of homology described in this section is common to those de-
velopmental biologists who take theoretical issues such as questions about homology
seriously or are interested in developmental issues beyond molecular biology. The ho-
mology concept of many developmental geneticists, on the other hand, might quite well
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be the molecular homology concept described in the next section.
6It became clear, however, that homology at different levels has to be kept apart. In
fact, it is nowadays well known that homologies at different hierarchical levels cannot be
identified and do not translate straightforwardly into each other (de Beer 1971; Roth
1988; Striedter and Nothcutt 1991; Wagner and Misof 1993; Bolker and Raff 1996;
Abouheif et al. 1997).
7As we saw in the case of evolutionary biology, phylogenetic homology is a concep-
tual precondition that makes adaptation explanations possible. Homology refers to the
entities that undergo evolutionary change, but by itself it does not explain the change.
8The purpose of this paper is not take a normative stance as regards these different
views of homology, e.g., by maintaining that only one of the discussed concepts is really
about homology. The philosophical project is to describe the different usages of the
term ‘homology’ and to explain them with reference to the theoretical goals of different
approaches.
9To be sure, in branches of molecular biology that are not so much life science
oriented but deal with molecular evolution or molecular phylogeny things are different.
Here it is important to know whether two genes actually have the same evolutionary
origin—whether they are actually the same ones. For this reason, the understanding of
molecular homology as mere sequence similarity has been criticized by several molecular
biologists (see, e.g., Reeck et al. 1987). These authors view the (more recent) concept
of molecular homology as derived from or parallel to the concept of homology in mor-
phological structures. In molecular evolution and phylogeny the focus is on how genes
evolve and how they are related. The question of sequence similarity due to common
ancestry (homology) or due to convergence (analogy) has to be addressed (see, e.g.,
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Fitch 1970). Such a homology concept as used in molecular phylogeny and evolution
does not refer to mere similarity of genes and proteins, but also to the explanation of
this resemblance. This homology concept is theoretically more robust and more like
the application of phylogenetic homology to the molecular level.
